Acquisition of Malicious Code Using Active Learning

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ABSTRACT
The recent growth in network usage has motivated the creation of new malicious code for various purposes, including economic and other malicious purposes. Currently, dozens of new malicious codes are created every day, and this number is expected to increase in coming years. Today's signature-based anti-viruses and heuristic-based methods are accurate, but cannot detect new malicious code. Recently, classification algorithms were used successfully for the detection of malicious code. We present a complete methodology for the detection of unknown malicious code, inspired by text categorization concepts. However, this approach can be exploited further to achieve a more accurate and efficient acquisition method of unknown malicious files. We use an Active-Learning framework that enables the selection of the unknown files for fast acquisition. We performed an extensive evaluation of a test collection consisting of more than 30,000 files. We present a rigorous evaluation setup, consisting of real-life scenarios, in which the malicious file content is expected to be low, at about 10% of the files in the stream. We define specific evaluation measures based on the known precision and recall measures, which show the accuracy of the acquisition process and the improvement in the classifier resulting from the efficient acquisition process.

General Terms
Measurement, Performance, Experimentation, Security

Keywords
Malicious code detection, Active Learning.

1. INTRODUCTION
The term malicious code (malcode) commonly refers to pieces of code, not necessarily executable files, which are intended to harm, generally or in particular, the specific owner of the host. Malcodes are classified, based mainly on their transport mechanism, into five main categories: worms, viruses, Trojans, and a new group that is becoming more common, which comprises remote access Trojans and backdoors. The recent growth in high-speed internet connections and internet network services has led to an increase in the creation of new malicious codes for various purposes, based on economic, political, criminal or terrorist motives (among others). Some of these codes have been used to gather information, such as passwords and credit card numbers, as well as for behavior monitoring. A recent survey by McAfee indicates that about 4% of search results from the major search engines on the web contain malicious code. Additionally, Shin et al. [17] found that above 15% of the files in the KaZaa network contained malicious code. Thus, we assume that the proportion of malicious files in real life is about or less than 10%, but we also consider other options.

Current anti-virus technology is primarily based on two approaches. Signature-based methods, which rely on the identification of unique strings in the binary code, while being very precise, are useless against unknown malicious code. The second approach involves heuristic-based methods, which are based on rules defined by experts, which define a malicious behavior, or a benign behavior, in order to enable the detection of unknown malcodes [6]. Other proposed methods include behavior blockers, which attempt to detect sequences of events in operating systems, and integrity checkers, which periodically check for changes in files and disks. However, besides the fact that these methods can be bypassed by viruses, their main drawback is that, by definition, they can only detect the presence of a malcode after the infected program has been executed, unlike the signature-based methods, including the heuristic-based methods, which are very time-consuming and have a relatively high false alarm rate.

The generalization of the detection methods, so that unknown malcodes can be detected, is therefore crucial. Recently, classification algorithms were employed to automate and extend the idea of heuristic-based methods. As we will describe in more detail shortly, the binary code of a file is represented by n-grams, and classifiers are applied to learn patterns in the code and classify large amounts of data. A classifier is a rule set which is learnt from a given training-set, including examples of classes, both malicious and benign files in our case. Recent studies, which we survey in the next section, have shown that this is a very successful strategy.

Another problem which is troubling the anti virus community is the acquisition of new malicious files, which it is very important to detect as quickly as possible. This is often done by using honeypots. Another option is to scan the traffic at the internet service provider, if accessible, to increase the probability of detection of a new malcode. However, the main challenge in both options is to scan all the files efficiently, especially when scanning internet node (router) traffic.

We present a methodology for malcode categorization based on concepts from text categorization. We present an extensive and rigorous evaluation of many factors in the methodology, based on
SVM classifiers using three types of kernels. The evaluation is based on a test collection containing more than 30,000 files. In this study we focus on the problem of efficiently scanning and acquiring new malicious code in a stream of executable files using Active Learners. We start with a survey of previous relevant studies. We describe the methods we used to represent the executable files. We present our approach of acquiring new malcodes using Active Learning and perform a rigorous evaluation. Finally, we present our results and discuss them.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Detecting Malcodes via Data Mining

Over the past five years, several studies have investigated the option of detecting unknown malcode based on its binary code. Schultz et al. [16] were the first to introduce the idea of applying machine learning (ML) methods for the detection of different malcodes based on their respective binary codes. They used three different feature extraction (FE) approaches -- program header, string features, and byte sequence features -- in which they applied four classifiers -- a signature-based method (anti-virus), Ripper, a rule-based learner, Naïve Bayes, and Multi-Naïve Bayes. This study found that all the ML methods were more accurate than the signature-based algorithm. The ML methods were more than twice as accurate, with the out-performing method being Naïve Bayes, using strings, or Multi-Naïve Bayes using byte sequences. Abou-Assaleh et al. [1] introduced a framework that used the common n-gram (CNG) method and the k nearest neighbor (KNN) classifier for the detection of malcodes. For each class, malicious and benign, a representative profile was constructed and assigned a new executable file. This executable file was compared with the profiles and matched to the most similar. Two different datasets were used: the I-worm collection, which consisted of 292 Windows internet worms, and the win32 collection, which consisted of 493 Windows viruses. The best results were achieved using 3-6 n-grams and a profile of 500-5000 features. Kolter and Maloof [9] presented a collection that included 1971 benign and 1651 malicious executables files. N-grams were extracted and 500 were selected using the information gain measure [12]. The vector of n-gram features was binary, presenting the presence or absence of a feature in the file and ignoring the frequency of feature appearances. In their experiment, they trained several classifiers: IBK (KNN), a similarity based classifier called Tfidf classifier, Naïve Bayes, SVM (SMO), and Decision tree (J48), the last three of which were also boosted. Two main experiments were conducted on two different datasets, a small collection and a large collection. The small collection consisted of 476 malicious and 561 benign executables and the larger collection of 1651 malicious and 1971 benign executables. In both experiments, the four best-performing classifiers were Boosted J48, SVM, boosted SVM, and IBK. Boosted J48 outperformed the others. The authors indicated that the results of their n-gram study were better than those presented by Schultz and Eskin [16]. Recently, Kolter and Maloof [10] reported an extension of their work, in which they classified malcodes into families (classes) based on the functions in their respective payloads. In the categorization task of multiple classifications, the best results were achieved for the classes: mass mailer, backdoor, and virus (no benign classes). In attempts to estimate their ability to detect malicious codes based on their issue dates, these classifiers were trained on files issued before July 2003, and then tested on 291 files issued from that point in time through August 2004. The results were, as expected, not as good as those of previous experiments. These results indicate the importance of maintaining such a training set through the acquisition of new executables, in order to cope with unknown new executables. Henchiri and Japkowicz [7] presented a hierarchical feature selection approach which makes possible the selection of n-gram features that appear at rates above a specified threshold in a specific virus family, as well as in more than a minimal amount of virus classes (families). They applied several classifiers, ID3, J48 Naïve Bayes, SVM- and SMO, to the dataset used by Schultz et al. [16] and obtained results that were better than those obtained using a traditional feature selection, as presented in [16], which focused mainly on 5-grams. However, it is not clear whether these results are reflective more of the feature selection method or of the number of features that were used. Moskovitch et al. [13], who are the authors of this study, presented a test collection consisting of more than 30,000 executable files, which is the largest known to us. They performed a wide evaluation consisting of five types of classifiers and focused on the imbalance problem in real life conditions, in which the percentage of malicious files is less than 10%, based on recent surveys. After evaluating the classifiers on varying percentages of malicious files in the training set and test sets, it was shown to achieve the optimal results when having similar proportions in the training set as expected in the test set.

2.2 Active Learning and Selective Sampling

A major challenge in supervised learning is labeling the examples in the dataset. Often the labeling is expensive since it is done manually by human experts. Labeled examples are crucial in order to train a classifier, and we would therefore like to reduce the number of labeling requirements. The Active Learning (AL) approach proposes a method which asks actively for labeling of specific examples, based on their potential contribution to the learning process. AL is roughly divided into two major approaches: the membership queries [2] and the selective-sampling approach [11]. In the membership queries approach the learner constructs artificial examples from the problem space, then asks for its label from the expert, and finally learns from it and so forth, in an attempt to cover the problem space and to have a minimal number of examples that represent most of the types among the existing examples. However, a potential practical problem in this approach is requesting a label for a nonsense example. The selective-sampling approach usually comprises a pool-based sampling, in which the learner is given a large set of unlabeled data (pool) from which it iteratively selects the most informative and contributive examples for labeling and learning, based on which it is carefully selects the next examples, until it meets stopping criteria.

Studies in several domains successfully applied active learning in order to reduce the effort of labeling examples. Unlike in random learning, in which a classifier is trained on a pool of labeled examples, the classifier actively indicates the specific examples that should be labeled, which are commonly the most informative examples for the training task. Two AL methods were considered in our experiments: Simple-Margin Tong and Koller [18] Error-Reduction Roy and McCallum [14].
2.3 Acquisition of New Malicious Code Using Active Learning

As we presented briefly earlier the option of acquiring new malicious files from the web and internet services providers is essential for fast detection and updating of the anti-viruses, as well as updating of the classifiers. However, manually inspecting each potentially malicious file is time-consuming, and often done by human experts. We propose using Active Learning as a selective sampling approach based on a static analysis of malicious code, in which the active learner identifies new examples which are expected to be unknown. Moreover, the active learner is expected to present a ranked list of the most informative examples, which are probably the most different from what currently is known.

3. METHODS

3.1 Text Categorization

To detect and acquire unknown malicious code, we suggest implementing well-studied concepts from the information retrieval (IR) and more specific text categorization domain. In execution of our task, binary files (executables) are parsed and n-gram terms are extracted. Each n-gram term in our task is analogous to words in the textual domain. Here are descriptions of the IR concepts used in this study. Salton and Weng [15] presented the vector space model to represent a textual file as a bag-of-words. After parsing the text and extracting the words, a vocabulary of the entire collection of words is constructed. Each of these words may appear zero to multiple times in a document.

A vector of terms is created, such that each index in the vector represents the term frequency (TF) in the document. Equation 1 shows the definition of a normalized TF, in which the term frequency is divided by the maximal appearing term in the document with values in the range of [0-1]. Another common representation is the TF Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF), which combines the frequency of a term in the document (TF) and its frequency in the documents collection, as shown in Equation 2, in which the term's (normalized) TF value is multiplied by the IDF = log (N/n), where N is the number of documents in the entire file collection and n is the number of documents in which the term appears.

\[
TF = \frac{\text{term frequency}}{\max(\text{term frequency in document})} \tag{1}
\]

\[
\text{TFIDF} = TF \times \log(DF),
\]

where

\[
DF = \frac{N}{n} \tag{2}
\]

3.2 Data Set Creation

We created a dataset of malicious and benign executables for the Windows operating system, which is the most commonly used and attacked. To the best of our knowledge, this collection is the largest ever assembled. We acquired the malicious files from the VX Heaven website\(^1\), having 7688 malicious files. To identify the

files, we used the Kaspersky2 anti-virus and the Windows version of the Unix ‘file’ command for file type identification. The files in the benign set, including executable and Dynamic Linked Library (DLL) files, were gathered from machines running the Windows XP operating system, which is currently considered the most used, on our campus. The benign set contained 22,735 files, which were reported by the Kaspersky anti-virus program as being completely virus-free.

3.3 Data Preparation and Feature Selection

We parsed the binary code of the executable files using several n-gram lengths moving windows, denoted by n. Vocabularies of 16,777,216, 1,084,793,035, 1,575,804,954 and 1,936,342,220, for 3-gram, 4-gram, 5-gram and 6-gram, respectively, were extracted. Later the TF and TFIDF representation were calculated for each n-gram in each file.

In machine learning applications, the large number of features (many of which do not contribute to the accuracy and may even decrease it) in many domains presents a huge problem. Moreover, in our task a reduction in the amount of features is crucial for practical reasons, but must be performed while simultaneously maintaining a high level of accuracy. This is due to the fact that, as shown earlier, the vocabulary size may exceed billions of features, far more than can be processed by any feature selection tool within a reasonable period of time. Additionally, it is important to identify those terms that appear in most of the files, in order to avoid zeroed representation vectors. Thus, initially the features having the highest DF value (Equation 2) were extracted. Based on the DF measure, two sets were selected, the top 5,500 terms and the top 1,000-6,500 terms. The set of top 1000 to 6,500 set of features was inspired by the removal of stop-words, as often done in information retrieval for common words. Later, feature selection methods were applied to each of these two sets. Since it is not the focus of this paper, we will describe the feature selection preprocessing very briefly. We used a filters approach, in which the measure was independent of any classification algorithm, to compare the performances of the different classification algorithms. In a filters approach, a measure is used to quantify the correlation of each feature to the class (malicious or benign) and estimate its expected contribution to the classification task. Three feature selection measures were used: as a baseline we used the document frequency measure DF (Equation 2), and additionally the Gain Ratio (GR) \([12]\) and Fisher Score \([5]\). Eventually the top 50, 100, 200, 300, 1000, 1500 and 2000 were selected from each feature selection.

3.4 Support Vector Machines

We employed the SVM classification algorithm using three different kernel functions, in a supervised learning approach. We briefly introduce the SVM classification algorithm and the principles and implementation of Active Learning that we used in this study. SVM is a binary classifier which finds a linear hyperplane that separates the given examples into the two given classes. Later an extension that enables handling multiclass classification was developed. SVM is widely known for its capacity to handle a large amount of features, such as text, as was shown by Joachims \([8]\). We used the Lib-SVM implementation of Chang \([4]\) that also handles multiclass classification.

\(^1\) http://vx.netlux.org

\(^2\) http://www.kaspersky.com
training set, in which an example is a vector \( x_i = \langle f_1, f_2, ..., f_n \rangle \), where \( f_i \) is a feature, and labeled by \( y_i = \{-1,+1\} \), the SVM attempts to specify a linear hyperplane that has the maximal margin, defined by the maximal (perpendicular) distance between the examples of the two classes. Figure 1 illustrates a two dimensional space, in which the examples are located according to their features and the hyperplane splits them according to their label.

![Figure 1. An SVM that separates the training set into two classes, having maximal margin in a two dimensional space.](image)

The examples lying closest to the hyperplane are the "supporting vectors" \( W \), the Normal of the hyperplane, is a linear combination of the most important examples (supporting vectors), multiplied by Lagrange multipliers (alphas). Since the dataset in the original space often cannot be linearly separated, a kernel function \( K \) is used. SVM actually projects the examples into a higher dimensional space in order to create linear separation of the examples. Note that when the kernel function satisfies Mercer’s condition, as was explained by Burges [3], \( K \) can be written as shown in Equation 3, where \( \Phi \) is a function that maps the example from the original feature space into a higher dimensional space, while \( K \) relies on “inner product” between the mappings of examples \( x_i, x_2 \). For the general case, the SVM classifier will be in the form shown in Equation 4, while \( n \) is the number of examples in training set, and \( w \) is defined in Equation 5.

\[
K(x_1, x_2) = \Phi(x_1) \cdot \Phi(x_2) 
\]

\[
f(x) = \text{sign}(w \cdot \Phi(x)) = \text{sign}\left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i y_i K(x, x) \right) \tag{4}
\]

\[
w = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i y_i \Phi(x_i) \tag{5}
\]

Two commonly used kernel functions were used: Polynomial kernel, as shown in Equation 6, creates polynomial values of degree \( p \), where the output depends on the direction of the two vectors, examples \( x_1, x_2 \), in the original problem space. Note that a private case of a polynomial kernel, having \( p=1 \), is actually the Linear kernel. Radial Basis Function (RBF), as shown in Equation 7, in which a Gaussian is used as the RBF and the output of the kernel depends on the Euclidean distance of examples \( x_1, x_2 \).

\[
K(x_1, x_2) = (x_1 \cdot x_2 + 1)^p \tag{6}
\]

\[
K(x_1, x_2) = \exp(- \frac{\|x_1 - x_2\|^2}{2\sigma^2}) \tag{7}
\]

### 3.5 Active Learning

In this study we implemented two selective sampling (pool-based) AL methods: the Simple Margin presented by Tong and Koller, [18] and Error Reduction presented by Roy and McCallum, [14].

#### 3.5.1 Simple-Margin

This method is directly oriented to the SVM classifier. As was explained in the section 3.4, by using a kernel function, the SVM implicitly projects the training examples into a different (usually higher dimensional) feature space, denoted by \( F \). In this space there is a set of hypotheses that are consistent with the training-set, meaning that they create linear separation of the training-set. This set of consistent hypotheses is called the Version-Space (VS). From among the consistent hypotheses, the SVM then identifies the best hypothesis that has the maximal margin. Thus, the motivation of the Simple-Margin AL method is to select those examples from the pool, so that these will reduce the number of hypotheses in the VS, in an attempt to achieve a situation where VS contains the most accurate and consistent hypotheses.

Calculating the VS is complex and impractical when large datasets are considered, and therefore this method is oriented through simple heuristics that are based on the relation between the VS and the SVM with the maximal margin. Practically, examples that lie closest to the separating hyperplane (inside the margin) are more likely to be informative and new to the classifier, and thus will be selected for labeling and acquisition.

#### 3.5.2 Error-Reduction

The Error Reduction method is more general and can be applied to any classifier that can provide probabilistic values for its classification decision. Based on the estimation of the expected error, which is achieved through adding an example into the training-set with each label, the example that is expected to lead to the minimal expected error will be selected and labeled. Since the real future error rates are unknown, the learner utilizes its current classifier in order to estimate those errors. In the beginning of an AL trial, an initial classifier \( P_D (y \mid x) \) is trained over a randomly selected initial set \( D \). For every optional label \( y \in Y \) (of every example \( x \) in the pool \( P \)) the algorithm induces a new classifier \( P_{D'} (y \mid x) \) trained on the extended training set \( D' = D + (x, y) \), Thus (in our binary case, malicious and benign are the only optional labels) for every example \( X \) there are two classifiers, each one for each label. Then for each one of the example’s classifiers the future expected generalization error is estimated using a log-loss function, shown in Equation 8. The log-loss function measures the error degree of the current classifier over all the examples in the pool, where this classifier represents the induced classifier as a result of selecting a specific example from the pool and adding it to the training set, having a specific label. Thus, for every example \( x \in P \) we actually have two future generalization errors (one for each optional label as was calculated in Equation 8). Finally, an average is calculated for the two errors, which is called the self-estimated average error, based
on Equation 9. It can be understood that it is built of the weighted average so that the weight of each error of example \( x \) with label \( y \) is given by the prior probability of the initial classifier to classify correctly example \( x \) with label \( y \). Finally, the example \( x \) with the lowest expected self-estimated error is chosen and added to the training set. In a nutshell, an example will be chosen from the pool only if it dramatically improves the confidence of the current classifier more than all the examples in the pool (means lower estimated error).

\[
E_{p^*_y} = \frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{x \in D} \sum_{y \in Y} p^*_D (y \mid x) \cdot \left[ \log(p^*_D (y \mid x)) \right] \quad (8)
\]

\[
\sum_{y \in Y} p^*_D (y \mid x) \cdot E_{p^*_y}. \quad (9)
\]

4. Evaluation

To evaluate the use of AL in the task of efficient acquisition of new files, we defined specific measures derived from the experimental objectives. The first experimental objective was to determine the optimal settings of the term representation (TF or TFIDF), n-grams representation (3, 4, 5 or 6), the best global range (top 5500 or top 1000-6500) and feature selection method (DF, FS or GR), and the top selection (50, 100, 200, 300, 1000, 1500 or 2000). After determining the optimal settings, we performed a second experiment to evaluate our proposed acquisition process using the two AL methods.

4.1 Evaluation Measures

For evaluation purposes, we measured the True Positive Rate (TPR) measure, which is the number of positive instances classified correctly, as shown in Equation 10. False Positive Rate (FPR), which is the number of negative instances misclassified Equation 10, and the Total Accuracy, which measures the number of absolutely correctly classified instances, either positive or negative, divided by the entire number of instances, shown in Equation 11.

\[
TPR = \frac{|TP|}{|TP| + |FN|}; \quad FPR = \frac{|FP|}{|FP| + |TN|} \quad (10)
\]
\[
Total Accuracy = \frac{|TP| + |TN|}{|TP| + |FP| + |TN| + |FN|} \quad (11)
\]

4.2 Evaluation Measures for the Acquisition Process

In this study we wanted to evaluate the acquisition performance of the Active-Learner from a stream of files presented by the test set, containing benign and malicious executables, including new (unknown) and not-new files. Actually, the task here is to evaluate the capability of the module to acquire the new files in the test set, which cannot be evaluated only by the common measures evaluated earlier. Figure 2 illustrates the evaluation scheme describing the varying contents of the test set and Acquisition set that will be explained shortly. The datasets contain two types of files: Malicious (M) and Benign (B). While the Malicious region is presented as a bit smaller, it is actually significantly smaller. These datasets contain varying files partially known to the classifier, from the training set, and a larger portion of New (N) files, which are expected to be acquired by the Active Learner, illustrated by a circle. The active learner acquires from the stream part of the files, illustrated by the Acquired (A) circle. Ideally the Acquired circle will be identical to the New circle.

![Figure 2. Illustration of the evaluation scheme, including the Malicious (M) and Benign (B) Files, the New files to acquire (N) and the actual Acquired (A) files.](image)

To define the evaluation measures, we define the resultant regions in the evaluation scheme by:

- \( A \cap M \cap N \) – The Malicious files Acquired, but not New.
- \( A \cap M \cap N \) – The Malicious files Acquired and New.
- \( M \cap N \cap A \) – The New Malicious files, but not Acquired.
- \( A \cap B \cap N \) – The Benign files Acquired, but not New.
- \( A \cap B \cap N \) – The Benign files Acquired and New.

For the evaluation of the said scheme we used the known Precision and Recall measures, often used in information retrieval and text categorization. We first define the traditional precision and recall measures. Equation 12 represents the Precision, which is the proportion of the accurately classified examples among the classified examples. Equation 13 represents the Recall measure, which is the proportion of the classified examples from a specific class in the entire class examples.

\[
\text{precision} = \frac{|\text{relevant examples} \cap \text{classified examples}|}{|\text{classified examples}|} \quad (12)
\]
\[
\text{recall} = \frac{|\text{relevant examples} \cap \text{classified documents}|}{|\text{relevant examples}|} \quad (13)
\]

As we will elaborate later, the acquisition evaluation set will contain both malicious and benign files, partially new (were not in the training set) and partially not-new (appeared in the training set), and thus unknown to the classifier. To evaluate the selective method we define here the precision and recall measures in the context of our problem. Corresponding to the evaluation scheme presented in Figure 2, the precision_new_malicious is defined in Equation 14 by the proportion among the new benign files which were acquired and the acquired benign files. Similarly the recall_new_malicious is defined in Equation 15. The recall_new_benign is defined in Equation 16 by how many new
benign files in the stream were acquired from the entire set of new benign in the stream. The recall_new_malicious is defined similarly in Equation 17.

\[ \text{precision}_\text{new}_\text{Benign} = \frac{A \cap B \cap N}{A \cap B} \quad (14) \]

\[ \text{precision}_\text{new}_\text{Malicious} = \frac{A \cap M \cap N}{A \cap M} \quad (15) \]

\[ \text{recall}_\text{new}_\text{Benign} = \frac{A \cap B \cap N}{N \cap B} \quad (16) \]

\[ \text{recall}_\text{new}_\text{Malicious} = \frac{A \cap M \cap N}{N \cap M} \quad (17) \]

The acquired examples are important for the incremental improvement of the classifier. The Active Learner acquires the new examples which are mostly important for the improvement of the classifier, but not all the new examples are acquired, especially these which the classifier is certain on their classification. However, we would like to be aware of any new files (especially malicious) in order to examine them and add them to the repository. This set of files are the New and not Acquired (N\A), thus, we would like to measure the accuracy of the classification of these files to make sure that the classifier classified them correctly. This is done using the Accuracy measure as presented in Equation 11 on the subset defined by (N\A), where for example \(|\text{TP}(N \setminus A)|\) is the number of malicious executables that were labeled correctly as malicious, out of the un-acquired new examples. In addition we measured the classification accuracy of the classifier in classifying examples which were not new and not acquired. Thus, using again the Accuracy measure (Equation 11) for the \(\neg(N \cup A)\) defines our evaluation measure.

5. Experiments and Results

5.1 Experiment 1

To determine the best settings of the file representation and the feature selection we performed a wide and comprehensive set of evaluation runs, including all the combinations of the optional settings for each of the aspects, amounting to 1536 runs in a 5-fold cross validation format for all the three kernels. Note that the files in the test-set were not in the training-set presenting unknown files to the classifier.

Global Feature Selection vs n-grams. Figure 3 presents the mean accuracy of the combinations of the term representations and n-grams. The top 5,500 features outperformed with the TF representation and the 5-gram in general. The out-performing of the TF has meaningful computational advantages, on which we will elaborate in the Discussion. In general, mostly the 5-grams outperformed the others.

Feature Selections and Top Selections. Figure 4 presents the mean accuracy of the three feature selection methods and the seven top selections. For fewer features, the FS outperforms, while above the Top 300 there was not much difference. However, in general the FS outperformed the other methods. For all the three feature selection methods there is a decrease in the accuracy when using above Top 1000 features.

Classifiers. After determining the best configuration of 5-Grams, Global top 5500, TF representation, Fischer score, and Top300, we present in Table 1 the results of each SVM kernel. The RBF kernel out-performed the others and had a low false positive rate, while the other kernels also perform very well.
Table 1. The RBF kernel outperformed while maintaining a low level of false positive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifier</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>FN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVM-LIN</td>
<td>0.921</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM-POL</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM-RBF</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Experiment 2: Files Acquisition

In the second experiment we used the optimal settings from experiment 1, applying only the RBF kernel which outperformed (Table 1). In this set of experiments, we set an imbalanced representation of malicious-benign proportions in the test-set to reflect real life conditions of 10% malicious files in the stream, based on the information provided in the Introduction. In a previous study [13] we found that the optimal proportions in such scenario are similar settings in the training set. The Dataset includes 25000 executables (22,500 benign, 2500 malicious), having 10% malicious and: 90% benign contents as in real life conditions.

The evaluation test collection included several components: Training-Set, Acquisition-Set (Stream), and Test-set. The Acquisition-set consisted of benign and malicious examples, including known executables (that appeared in the training set) and unknown executables (which did not appear in the training set) and the Test-set included the entire Data-set.

These sets were used in the following steps of the experiment:

1. A Learner is trained on the Training-Set.
2. The model is tested on the Test-Set to measure the initial accuracy.
3. A stream of files is introduced to the Active Learner, which asks selectively for labeling of specific files, which are acquired.
4. After acquiring all the new informative examples, the Learner is trained on the new Training-Set.
5. The Learner is tested on the Test-Set.

We applied the learners in each step using 2 different variation of cross validation for each AL method. For the Simple-Margin we used variation of 10-fold cross validation. Thus, the Acquisition Set (stream) contained part of the folds in the Training Set and the Test Set, which was used for evaluation prior to the Acquisition phase and after, contained all the folds.

5.2.1 Simple-Margin AL method

We applied the Simple Margin Active Learner in the experimental setup presented earlier. Table 2 presents the mean results of the cross validation experiment. Both the Benign and the Malicious Precision were very high, above 99%, which means that most of the acquired files were indeed new. The Recall measures were quite low, especially the Benign Recall. This can be explained by the need of the Active Learner to improve the accuracy. An interesting fact is the difference in the Recall of the Malicious and the Benign, which can be explained by the varying proportions in the training set, which was 10% malicious.

The classification accuracy of the new examples that were not acquired was very high as well, being close to 99%, which was also the classification accuracy of the not new, which was 100%. However, the improvement between the Initial and Final accuracy was significant, which shows the importance and the efficiency in the acquisition process.

Table 2: The Simple-Margin acquisition performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Simple Margin Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Precision Benign</td>
<td>99.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Malicious</td>
<td>99.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Benign</td>
<td>33.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Malicious</td>
<td>82.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy (N \setminus A)</td>
<td>98.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy ((N \cup A))</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Accuracy on Test-Set</td>
<td>86.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Accuracy on Test-Set</td>
<td>92.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Examples in Stream</td>
<td>10250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of New Examples</td>
<td>7750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Examples Acquired</td>
<td>2931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2 Error-Reduction AL method

We performed the experiment using the Error Reduction method. Table 3 presents the mean results of the cross validation experiment. In the acquisition phase, the Benign Precision was high, while the Malicious Precision was relatively low, which means that almost 30% of the examples that were acquired were not actually new. The Recall measures were similar to those for the Simple-Margin, in which the Benign Recall was significantly lower than the Malicious Recall. The classification accuracy of the not acquired files was high both for the new and for the not new examples.

Table 3: The Error-reduction acquisition performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Error Reduction Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Precision Benign</td>
<td>97.563%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Malicious</td>
<td>72.617%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Benign</td>
<td>29.050%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Malicious</td>
<td>75.676%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy (N \setminus A)</td>
<td>98.316%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy ((N \cup A))</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Accuracy on Test-Set</td>
<td>85.803%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Accuracy on Test-Set</td>
<td>89.045%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Examples in Stream</td>
<td>3010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of New Examples</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Examples Acquired</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Discussion and Conclusions

We introduced the task of efficient acquisition of unknown malicious files in a stream of executable files. We proposed using Active Learning as a selective method for the acquisition of the most important files in the stream to improve the classifier's performance. This approach can be applied at a network communication node (router) at a network service provider to increase the probability of acquiring new malicious files. A methodology for the representation of malicious and benign executables for the task of unknown malicious code detection was presented, adopting ideas from Text Categorization.

In the first experiment, we found that the TFIDF representation has no added value over the TF, which is not the case in IR. This is very important, since using the TFIDF representation introduces some computational challenges in the maintenance of the measurements whenever the collection is updated. To reduce the number of n-gram features, which ranges from millions to billions, we used the DF threshold. We examined the concept of stop-words in IR in our domain and found that the top features have to be taken (e.g., top 5500 in our case), and not those of an intermediate level. Having the top features enables vectors which are less zeroed, since the selected features appear in most of the files. The Fisher Score feature selection outperformed the other methods, and using the top 300 features resulted in the best performance.

In the second experiment, we evaluated the proposed method of applying Active Learning for the acquisition of new malicious files. We examined two AL methods, Simple Margin and Error Reduction, and evaluated them rigorously using cross validation. The evaluation consisted of three main phases: training on the initial Training-set and testing on a Test-set, acquisition phase on a dataset including known files (which were presented in the training set) and new files, and eventually evaluating the classifier after the acquisition on the Test-set to demonstrate the improvement in the classifier performance. For the acquisition phase evaluation we presented a set of measures based on the Precision and Recall measures dedicated for the said task, which refer to each portion of the dataset, the acquired benign and malicious, separately. For the not acquired files we evaluated the performance of the classifier in classifying them accurately to justify that indeed they did not need to be acquired.

In general, both methods performed very well, with the Simple Margin performing better than the Error Reduction. In the acquisition phase, the benign and malicious Precision was often very high; however, the malicious Precision for the Error Reduction was relatively low. The benign and malicious Recalls were relatively low and reflected the classifier's needs. An interesting phenomenon was that a significantly higher percentage of new malicious files, relatively to the benign files, were acquired. This can be explained by the imbalanced proportions of the malicious-benign files in the initial training set. The classification accuracy of the not acquired files, unknown and known, was extremely high in both experimental methods.

The evaluation of the classifier before the acquisition (initial training set) and after showed an improvement in accuracy which justifies the process. However, the relatively low accuracy, unlike in the first experiment, can be explained by the small training set which resulted from the cross validation setup.

When applying such a method for practical purposes we propose that a human first examine the malicious acquired examples. However, note that there might be unknown files which were not acquired, since the classifier didn’t consider them as informative enough and often had a good level of classification accuracy. However, these files should be acquired. In order to identify these files, one can apply an anti-virus on the files which were not acquired and were classified as malicious. The files which were not recognized by the anti-virus are suspected as unknown malicious files and should be examined and acquired.

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7. REFERENCES


